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UNFIT FOR DUTY: THE OFFICER AND DIRECTOR BAR AS A 
REMEDY FOR FRAUD 
Renee M. Jones* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Until recently, scholars regarded the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) as a model administrative agency.1  Its haloed 
reputation began to fade, however, as a series of catastrophes jolted the 
corporate world at the turn of the 21st century.  The Enron and 
WorldCom scandals, the internet bubble collapse, the subprime 
mortgage crisis, and Bernie Madoff’s brazen and long-running Ponzi 
scheme all revealed weaknesses within the agency that a high profile 
enforcement agenda had helped to mask. 
The SEC has drawn criticism not only for failing to detect or prevent 
these catastrophic frauds, but also for its ineffective post-crisis response.  
Much of this criticism focuses on the efforts of the agency’s 
enforcement division.2  Although the SEC’s website boasts that it has 
brought actions against 157 financial firms, including charges against 66 
senior executives, and extracted more than $2.6 billion in penalties and 
other forms of monetary relief,3 closer scrutiny reveals that no senior 
executive of a failed or bailed out firm has personally paid penalties,4 
and no high-level executive has been charged with a crime.5  
 
 * Professor, Boston College Law School.  This Article was prepared for the Symposium on 
Addressing the Challenges of Protecting the Public: Enforcement Practices and Policies in the Post-
Financial Crisis Era at the University of Cincinnati College of Law on March 15, 2013.  The Article 
benefited from comments from Jayne Barnard and Lyman Johnson and participants in the Boston 
College Law School Summer Workshop.  Thanks also to Andrew Miller for excellent research 
assistance.  
 1. See, e.g., BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 62 (6th ed. 
2006). 
 2. See Ross MacDonald, Note, Setting Examples, Not Settling: Toward a New SEC 
Enforcement Paradigm, 91 TEX. L. REV. 419, 435 (2012) (asserting that the Commission is “failing 
miserably”). 
 3. See SEC Enforcement Actions Addressing Misconduct that Led to or Arose from the 
Financial Crisis, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-fc.shtml (last visited June 12, 2013). 
 4. Two exceptions to this assertion are discussed infra Part III. 
 5. Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Criminal Affirmance: Going Beyond the Deterrence Paradigm to 
Examine the Social Meaning of Declining Prosecution of Elite Crime, 45 CONN. L. REV. 865, 868 
(2013) (noting that the Justice Department has not criminally charged any of the key officers or 
managers of the financial institutions deemed ‘too big to fail’); see also James Ridgeway, How to Put 
Wall Street CEOs in Prison, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 8, 2011, 1:59 PM), http:// 
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2011/03/how-put-wall-street-ceos-prison (quoting Charles Ferguson, 
Oscar winning director of the documentary film “Inside Job”: “Forgive me, I must start by pointing out 
that three years after a horrific financial crisis caused by fraud, not a single financial executive has gone 
to jail—and that’s wrong.”).  
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The response of federal officials to the 2008 financial crisis contrasts 
starkly with the approach after the 2001–2002 accounting scandals.  In 
that round, a number of top executives faced trial, and prosecutors won 
convictions against Dennis Kozlowski, Kenneth Lay, Jeffrey Skilling, 
and Bernard Ebbers, among others.6  Although the SEC dragnet spared 
the directors of WorldCom and Enron, private plaintiffs pursuing 
securities fraud claims extracted unprecedented personal payments from 
outside directors of these firms.7 
Much of the recent criticism of the SEC’s enforcement efforts has 
focused on its practice of allowing large financial firms (many of which 
are repeat offenders) to settle SEC charges without admitting or denying 
liability.8  Of equal concern is the agency’s failure to identify or punish 
the individuals responsible for corporate misdeeds.  A number of 
problems stem from these routine SEC settlement practices.9  First, 
critics argue that settling cases without identifying culpable individuals 
deprives the public of information about who is responsible for the 
collapse of the too-big-to-fail firms.10  Such opacity prevents institutions 
and investors from protecting themselves against future financial harm.11  
Others worry that the lack of personal accountability renders the 
securities laws ineffective in deterring fraud.12  From a retributive 
perspective, the absence of personal penalties allows corporate officials 
to avoid facing any consequence for their transgressions and deprives 
the public of the opportunity to express disapproval of their conduct.13  
Finally, many fear that the SEC’s practice of settling cases without a full 
accounting of responsibility undermines public confidence in 
 
 6. See Ramirez, supra note 5, at 884 & n.77. 
 7. See Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting 
Accountability in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105, 155 (2006); Bernard Black et al., 
Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1129 (2006). 
 8. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (criticizing 
the SEC’s “long standing policy, hallowed by history but not by reason,” of allowing defendants to 
settle SEC charges without admitting liability); SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., Nos. 09 CIV. 6829 (JSR), 
10 Civ. 0215 (JSR), 2010 WL 624581 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010) (questioning the propriety of the 
proposed SEC settlement with Bank of America); Samuel W. Buell, Liability and Admissions of 
Wrongdoing in Public Enforcement of Law, 82 U. CIN. L. REV.  504, 508–13 (2013).   
 9. See MacDonald, supra note 2, at 435. 
 10. Buell, supra note 8, at 513; Citigroup, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 335 (“[T]here is an overriding 
public interest in knowing the truth. . . .  [T]he SEC, of all agencies, has a duty, inherent in its statutory 
mission, to see that the truth emerges; and if it fails to do so, this Court must not, in the name of 
deference or convenience, grant judicial enforcement to the agency’s contrivances.”). 
 11. Buell, supra note 8, at 13. 
 12. MacDonald, supra note 2, at 444; Ramirez, supra note 5, at 921. 
 13. Ramirez, supra note 5, at 930; Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 943, 951–52 (1995) (discussing how the social meanings attached to various actions create 
a framework of understanding within which individuals live). 
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government.14 
For these reasons, commentators have called on the SEC and the 
Justice Department to bring more cases against the individuals who led 
the failed financial firms to ruin.  They worry that only a credible threat 
of prison time or severe monetary sanctions can deter corporate 
executives from excessive risk-taking and fraud.  Although such 
concerns are valid, this Article focuses on another enforcement tool that 
has received less scholarly attention: the power to bar officers and 
directors of public companies from future service in such roles. 
The SEC has long had the power to obtain federal court orders 
barring individuals who violate the antifraud provisions of the federal 
securities laws from future service as officers or directors of public 
companies.  Although Congress recently expanded the agency’s power 
in this realm, the SEC seldom pursues bars against directors or senior 
executives of large firms.  This Article argues that if the SEC pursued 
bars more regularly, it could better motivate executives and directors to 
heed their obligations under the federal securities laws.  Such a strategy 
should also spur directors to perform more responsibly the enhanced 
oversight duties imposed by Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank.15  
The proposal for increased use of the officer and director bar should 
sidestep concerns expressed by some commentators about the fairness of 
director liability schemes under corporate and securities laws.  Some 
scholars maintain that it is unfair to hold directors liable for accounting 
frauds spearheaded by the managers they oversee.16  They claim the 
mere prospect of such liability would deter capable directors from 
serving.17  These concerns have prompted judges and legislators to erect 
a veritable bulwark against director liability under state and federal 
 
 14. Buell, supra note 8, at 513; Luis Aguilar, SEC Commissioner, Taking a No-Nonsense 
Approach to Enforcing the Federal Securities Laws, Remarks at Securities Enforcement Forum 2012 
(Oct. 18, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171491510#_edn6 
(citing statistics showing that “61% of investors have no confidence in government regulators”); see 
generally Matt Taibbi, Why Isn’t Wall Street In Jail?, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 16, 2011), available at 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-isnt-wall-street-in-jail-20110216 (asserting that “federal 
regulators and prosecutors have let banks and finance companies that tried to burn the world economy to 
the ground get off with carefully orchestrated settlements”) [hereinafter Taibbi, Wall Street Jail]; Matt 
Taibbi, Bank of America: Too Crooked to Fail, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 14, 2012), available at 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/bank-of-america-too-crooked-to-fail-20120314. 
 15. This article builds on earlier work that addresses weaknesses in the enforcement system for 
directors’ fiduciary duties.  See Renee M. Jones & Michelle Welsh, Toward a Public Enforcement 
Model of Directors’ Duties of Oversight, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 343, 343–44 (2012); Jones, supra 
note 7, at 113–17. 
 16. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. 
L. 976, 982–85 (2009) (arguing for a high bar for director liability for risk management failures). 
 17. See, e.g., Black et al., supra note 7, at 1140–41 (stating “a significantly higher level of risk 
for outside directors could well deter good candidates from serving and make directors who do serve 
excessively cautious and process-conscious”). 
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law.18   
These standard arguments against director liability do not apply with 
equal force to the proposed policy of removing culpable directors from 
positions in which they might cause further harm to public investors.  
Indeed, a common argument against director liability is that the fair and 
natural consequence for director oversight failures is the loss of future 
professional opportunities that stems from one’s association with 
corporate mismanagement or fraud.19  However, anecdotal and empirical 
data suggest that the purported reputational harm does not keep directors 
from continuing to occupy fiduciary positions at public companies.20  
Therefore, a policy that bars directors whose oversight failures lead to 
catastrophic financial harm seems an appropriate means for ensuring the 
natural consequences that market forces have failed to effect.21 
This Article therefore argues that the SEC should more regularly seek 
to bar senior executives and outside directors of corporations impacted 
by fraud.  It shows that astronomical corporate penalties and the remote 
prospect of criminal prosecution have failed to deter corporate officials 
from making reckless decisions or abiding fraud.  After laying out the 
case for the  increased use of bar orders, the Article recommends 
changes to the SEC’s enforcement strategies that could help the agency 
improve its success rate when seeking bar orders in court.  The Article 
proceeds as follows.  Part II takes on traditional deterrence theory and 
demonstrates that the threat of jail and ever increasing monetary 
penalties have failed to deter corporate officials from committing fraud.  
It then draws on criminal and psychological research to argue that 
modest penalties commensurate with a defendant’s degree of culpability 
 
 18. See Jones, supra note 7, at 115. 
 19. Black et al., supra note 7, at 1135. 
 20. For anecdotal accounts, see Former Enron Directors Then and Now, WASH. POST (June 6, 
2006), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/06/01/AR2006060101852.html (reporting on former Enron directors who 
continued to serve on other public company boards); Louis Lavelle, Enron Directors: Unfit to Serve 
Anywhere?, BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 11, 2002), available at http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2002-
02-11/enron-directors-unfit-to-serve-anywhere (reporting on efforts by shareholder activists to unseat 
former Enron directors from other corporate boards); Steven M. Davidoff, Despite Worries, Serving at 
the Top Carries Little Risk, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2011), available at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/06/07/despite-worries-serving-at-the-top-carries-little-risk (noting 
that directors of failed financial firms continue to serve as directors of other public companies).  For an 
empirical investigation into the same matter, see Steven M. Davidoff et al., Do Outside Directors Face 
Labor Market Consequences? A Natural Experiment from the Financial Crisis, HARV. BUS. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2200552 
(concluding “[t]here does not appear to be a viable labor market for outside directors to sufficiently 
motivate them to act in the way that regulators and perhaps shareholders may wish them to”). 
 21. In a similar vein, Lyman Johnson recently recommended that Congress authorize bankruptcy 
courts to debar “faithless fiduciaries” from occupying leadership positions in corporate organizations.  
See Lyman Johnson, Debarring Faithless Corporate and Religious Fiduciaries in Bankruptcy, 19 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 523 (2011). 
2013] THE OFFICER AND DIRECTOR BAR AS A REMEDY FOR FRAUD 443 
would be more effective in encouraging compliance with law.  Part III 
outlines the existing law governing the SEC’s power to impose officer 
and director bars.  It shows that, despite the agency’s campaign for 
expanded powers in this realm, it has been reluctant to seek bars against 
directors and high-level executives of prominent firms.  This Part 
invokes the example of a lesser-known Enron fraud and the facts of the 
financial crisis to show that director oversight failures have been a 
contributing factor in many of the last decade’s headline-grabbing 
corporate disasters.  Part IV lays out the case for broader utilization of 
the officer and director bar.  It argues that the SEC should investigate 
director conduct in cases of significant corporate fraud or failure and 
seek bars in instances of gross dereliction of duty.  It also addresses 
anticipated objections to this proposal.   
II. THE FAILURE OF TRADITIONAL PENALTIES TO DETER FRAUD 
The stock response from lawmakers to corporate and financial 
scandals has been greater criminalization of corporate and securities 
laws.  After WorldCom and Enron, Congress created a slew of new 
corporate crimes and increased criminal and civil penalties for fraud.22  
Congress also expanded the SEC’s enforcement powers and 
significantly increased the agency’s budget.23  The size of monetary 
settlements in SEC enforcement actions grew significantly after 
Sarbanes–Oxley, and continued to soar after the 2008 financial 
collapse.24   
For example, in a record-setting settlement, Bank of America paid 
$150 million to settle allegations that it misled investors in disclosures 
related to its acquisition of Merrill Lynch.25  Soon thereafter, Goldman 
Sachs agreed to pay $550 million to settle claims brought over its flawed 
disclosure in the Abacus CDO transactions.26  Finally, Citigroup agreed 
to a $285 million settlement of SEC charges that it fraudulently pawned 
off worthless mortgage backed securities on investors.27 
 
 22. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform 
(and it Might Just Work), 36 CONN. L. REV  915, 969–77 (2003) (cataloging new criminal provisions). 
 23. See Cut Proposed for SEC Budget, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2003 (“After accounting scandals at 
Enron Corp. and WorldCom Inc., Congress increased the SECs budget about 70% in fiscal year 2003.”). 
 24. See Top Ten SEC Settlements, NERA Economic Consulting, Securities Litigation Trends, 
available at http://www.securitieslitigationtrends.com/top10.asp (reporting post Sarbanes–Oxley SEC 
settlements ranging from $310 million to $800 million). 
 25. Louise Story, Judge Accepts SEC’s Deal with Bank of America, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2010), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/23/business/23bank.html. 
 26. Press Release, SEC, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 million to settle SEC Charges 
Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO (July 17, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm. 
 27. Press Release, SEC, Citigroup to Pay $285 Million to Settle SEC Charges for Misleading 
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A. The Futility of Corporate Penalties 
Despite these ever-escalating settlement amounts, the nation’s largest 
financial firms continued to distinguish themselves as serial re-
offenders.  Even before 2008, firms such as Citigroup and Merrill Lynch 
faced multiple fraud charges and paid huge sums to settle shareholder 
and government suits related to their participation in the Enron and 
WorldCom frauds, analyst conflicts of interest, and consumer and 
mortgage abuses.28   
The apparent futility of corporate level punishment has led many to 
assert that large corporate fines are both ineffective and ill-conceived.29  
These commentators point out that the costs of large settlements are 
borne by corporations, their insurers, and ultimately the shareholders, 
and therefore, do not directly impact the individuals who caused the 
fraud.30  Moreover, the sanctioned firms are so wealthy that even a fine 
running into the hundreds of millions of dollars is often viewed as a 
mere cost of doing business.31   
Although some commentators advocate for criminal charges against 
these firms, the deterrent potential of corporate criminal penalties is 
equally unavailing.  From public comments, it appears that Justice 
Department officials have determined that criminal charges against large 
corporations are off the table due to fear of dire collateral consequences 
and economic harm.32  Instead of pursuing criminal charges against 
 
Investors About CDO Company Profited From Proprietary Short Position Former Citigroup Employee 
Sued for his Role in Transaction (Oct 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr22134.htm.  The District Court for the Southern District 
of New York rejected the proposed settlement and ordered the parties to trial.  SEC v. Citigroup Global 
Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (rejecting settlement).  Both parties appealed the 
district court’s decision.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stayed the order requiring 
trial and heard the appeal on February 8, 2013, but has not rendered a decision on the merits of Judge 
Rakoff’s ruling.  Peter Latmann, Appeals Court Hears Arguments on Judge’s Rejection of  SEC- 
Citigroup Deal, DealBook, Feb. 18, 2013, available at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/08/appeals-court-hears-arguments-over-judge-rakoffs-rejection-
of-citigroup-settlement/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0. 
 28. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates 
and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN L. REV 963, 999–1002 (2009) (cataloging 
the banks’ roles in the Enron and WorldCom fiascos). 
 29. MacDonald, supra note 2, at 423 (“[D]espite the evidence that [] fines have almost no 
deterrent effect—the Commission’s success in extracting even exorbitant fines has failed to prevent or 
even curb a repeated pattern of financial abuse by a repeated group of abusers—the response from the 
Commission and Congress has always been the same: more and higher fines.”).  
 30. See Ralph Ferrara & Scott Fishwick, Mary Jo: SEC Enforcement? Go Back to the Future!, 
SECURITIES LAW DAILY (BNA) (May 20, 2013). 
 31. Id. (“[C]orporations internalize [penalties] as a cost of doing business, and, in any event, the 
cost is primarily borne by shareholders.”). 
 32. As then-Assistant Attorney General for the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division 
Lanny Breuer told Frontline:  
[I]n any given case, I think I and prosecutors around the country, being responsible, should 
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systemically important firms, the Justice Department has turned to 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, by which criminal charges are set 
aside on the condition that the corporation comply with remedial 
measures prescribed in the agreement.33  This new approach represents a 
reaction to the impact of indicting former accounting giant Arthur 
Andersen—a course commentators have described as a corporate “death 
penalty.”34   
B. The Deceptive Appeal of Individual Monetary Sanctions 
Scholarly disillusionment with the effectiveness and appropriateness 
of corporate-level penalties has led some to urge officials to focus their 
enforcement zeal on the individuals responsible for corporate fraud.  
After all, the theory goes, corporations do not commit fraud: only their 
human agents do.  To this end, some scholars recommend that regulators 
require responsible individuals to disgorge ill-gotten gains and pay 
monetary penalties from their own pockets.35  Still others call for 
 
speak to regulators, should speak to experts, because if I bring a case against institution A, and 
as a result of bringing that case there’s some huge economic effect, it affects the economy so that 
employees who had nothing to do with the wrongdoing of the company— . . . .  If it creates a 
ripple effect so that suddenly counterparties and other financial institutions or other companies 
that had nothing to do with this are affected badly, it’s a factor we need to know and 
understand. . . .  That doesn’t mean we won’t go forward, but it has to be a factor. 
Frontline: The Untouchables (PBS television broadcast Nov. 30, 2012), transcript available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy-financial-crisis/untouchables/lanny-
breuer-financial-fraud-has-not-gone-unpunished.  Consistent with this sentiment, Attorney 
General Eric Holder has testified:  
[W]hen we are hit with indications that if you do prosecute, if you do bring a criminal charge it 
will have a negative impact on the national economy, perhaps world economy . . . that is a 
function of the fact that some of these institutions have become too large. . . .  [I]t has an 
inhibiting impact on our ability to bring resolutions that I think would be more 
appropriate. . . .  [T]hat is something that we—you all . . . need to consider. 
Oversight of the U.S. Department of Justice: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 110th 




 33. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Deferred Prosecutions and Corporate Governance: An 
Integrated Approach to Investigation and Reform, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2014); Ramirez, supra 
note 5, at 905; DONNA NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT 896 (3d ed. 2012) 
(describing deferred prosecution agreement for KPMG). 
 34. Gabriel Markoff, Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty: Corporate 
Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 797, 800 (2013) (stating that 
after Arthur Andersen’s conviction, the Department of Justice has shifted its approach to enforcing 
criminal law against corporations).  Credit Suisse’s recent guilty plea to criminal charges for helping its 
clients evade taxes suggests that the Justice Department may be rethinking its stance against charging 
large financial institutions with crimes.  See Aruna Viswanatha, Douwe Miedema & Karen Freifeld, 
Credit Suisse Pleads Guilty to U.S. Criminal Charge in Tax Probe, REUTERS, May 19, 2014. 
 35. Donald H. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives “Naked, Homeless and Without 
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criminal prosecution of executives who led bailed out firms into 
bankruptcy or insolvency.36  
Although increased individual accountability for fraud seems 
necessary to restore public confidence in corporations, shifting the 
conventional penalty scheme from corporations to individuals is 
unlikely to yield the desired results.  Practically speaking, many of the 
individuals likely to face charges could not pay a comparable level of 
penalties, undermining the compensation objective of such penalties.37  
Further, those wealthy enough to pay large fines would be less likely to 
agree to serve as directors, absent loss-shifting provisions that would 
vitiate any deterrent effect.  From a theoretical perspective, there is also 
reason to doubt that the threat of astronomical penalties can actually 
deter fraud.  
C. Harsh Penalties Alone Cannot Deter Fraud 
Congress’s response to mounting corporate scandals conforms to the 
teachings of traditional deterrence theory, which holds that to deter an 
activity, its expected cost must exceed its expected benefit.38  According 
to this theory, in order to increase the law’s deterrent effect, public 
officials must either increase penalties for fraud or increase the 
likelihood of detection.39  With the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, Congress took 
action along both of these fronts.  The 2008 financial crisis shows that 
such efforts, though well-intentioned, failed to prevent further instances 
of devastating fraud.   
This result is not surprising in light of existing research on why 
individuals comply with the law.  Such research shows that most people 
comply with the law, not because they fear detection or punishment, but 
because they believe it is the right thing to do.  Most people obey the 
 
Wheels”: Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the Debate Over Entity Versus Individual 
Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 655 (2007); Lisa H. Nicholson, The Culture of Under-
Enforcement: Buried Treasure, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Corporate Pirate, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L. J. 
321, 371 (2007) (arguing for individual asset forfeiture in corporate fraud cases); MacDonald, supra 
note 2, at 445–46. 
 36. Ramirez, supra note 5, at 870 (the failure to prosecute financial crisis frauds sends a message 
that “crime does pay”); Taibbi, Wall Street Jail, supra note 14. 
 37. Congress formally recognized investor compensation as an SEC enforcement objective with 
Sarbanes–Oxley § 308—the Fair Fund provision.  This provision gives the SEC authority to establish an 
investor compensation fund to distribute any penalties it collects from securities violators to investors 
harmed by their fraud.  See Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded 
Investors?, 63 BUS. LAW. 317, 318–20 (2008). 
 38. See Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 639, 651–53 (1996) (stating the standard formulation).  
 39. See Michael A. Perino, Enron’s Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrent 
Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 671, 675–76 (2002). 
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law mainly because they have internalized its underlying values instilled 
from childhood through family and schooling.40  Society relies on this 
internalized moral sense to motivate corporate officials to manage 
corporations responsibly and to refrain from self-enrichment through 
self-dealing and fraud.  Yet the internalization of proper moral values 
can be undermined if the law is not enforced or if the punishment for 
breaking the law is perceived to be unfair.41  
In addition, psychological and criminal law research suggests that 
threats of harsh punishment do not provide the disciplinary effect that 
deterrence theory posits.42  According to psychologists, the best way to 
encourage the internalization of proper values is through modest 
rewards and sanctions that promote the desired behavior.43  As these 
psychologists explain, when a mild reward or threat induces desired 
behavior, the reward or threat alone is insufficient to create an 
independent justification for the conduct.  Individuals thus persuade 
themselves that they followed the conduct rule because they believed it 
was the right thing to do.  In contrast, when authorities rely on severe 
threats to control behavior, individuals may comply with the authorities’ 
directives when authority figures are present, or if they reasonably fear 
detection.  In the absence of constant monitoring, however, rules backed 
by severe threats are unlikely to be consistently obeyed.44 
D. The Bar as a Proportionate Penalty 
Increasing public frustration with the ineffectiveness of traditional 
approaches to fighting fraud suggests the need for a more creative 
approach to remedies—an approach that holds individuals accountable 
for their failures without wreaking the devastating personal 
consequences of astronomical fines or prison terms, which tend to 
undermine the perceived legitimacy of law.  The strategic use of the 
 
 40. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 64–66 (1990).  To illustrate, imagine you 
have just entered a small store to pick up a few grocery items.  Save for you, the store is empty, and a 
sign at the counter reads, “Be right back.”  You glance around impatiently for any sign of the cashier.  
You’re in a hurry.  What do you do?  Option (a), walk off with our goods without paying for them; 
option (b), leave an appropriate amount of cash on the counter and take your goods; or option (c), leave 
empty-handed and go shop at another store.  If you chose to follow option (b) or (c), what explains your 
choice?  The reason could not be fear of punishment or peer disapproval, because your thievery would 
never be discovered.  In such circumstances, the only reason not to steal would be your own internalized 
sense of right and wrong. 
 41. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. L REV. 453, 490–93 
(1997). 
 42. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of 
Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO L.J. 949, 985–89 (2003). 
 43. See Jones, supra note 7, at 150–51 (reviewing psychology literature). 
 44. See id. 
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power to bar directors and senior executives from further service in 
those roles could help the SEC overcome many of the difficulties it has 
encountered in seeking to deter large financial firms from committing 
serial fraud.45  
The officer and director bar has the potential to act as both a 
corrective and deterrent device.46  If sought more widely, the bar could 
operate both to prevent future misconduct by incompetent directors and 
reinforce societal assessments of director responsibility.  For these 
reasons, the SEC and the courts should look to the bar more frequently 
as a remedy for fraud. 
III. THE OFFICER AND DIRECTOR BAR 
A. History 
Before explaining why expanded use of the officer and director bar is 
an appropriate response to the fraud and mismanagement that has 
characterized the past decade, this Part reviews the law and practice 
surrounding the SEC’s authority in this realm.  Congress first granted 
the SEC’s formal authority to seek bar orders when it enacted the 
Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 
(Remedies Act).47  The Remedies Act added provisions to the Securities 
Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(Exchange Act) permitting the SEC to seek orders in federal court 
barring an individual who has violated the securities laws’ antifraud 
provisions from serving as an officer or director of a public company “if 
the person’s conduct demonstrates substantial unfitness to serve.”48  
Before the Remedies Act, the SEC had obtained bars as part of its 
traditional injunctive remedies.  Although most of these bars were 
obtained in consent decrees, courts recognized the remedy was available 
under the courts’ general equitable powers.49  
 
 45. As Michelle Welsh and I have described in prior work, in Australia, the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission (ASIC) has the power to bring actions against directors for breach of their 
disclosure obligations and for breach of the statutory duty of care.  ASIC has successfully pursued 
claims against directors (including outside directors) and obtained bars in several high profile cases.  See 
Jones & Welsh, supra note 15, at 381–86. 
 46. Aguilar, supra note 14 (“In terms of general deterrence the officer and director bar is one of 
the most effective enforcement mechanisms at the SEC’s disposal.”). 
 47. PL 101-429, Oct. 15, 1990, 104 Stat 921 (codified at 15 USCA § 77h-1 and 15 USCA 
§ 78(u)). 
 48. The Remedies Act added Section 21d(2) to the 1934 Act and Section 20(e) to the 1933 Act.  
 49. SEC v. Posner, 16 F.3d 520, 521 (2d Cir. 1994); SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 
1082, 1103 (2d Cir. 1972); see also Stephen M. Cutler, Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Remarks at the Glasser LegalWorks 20th Annual Federal 
Securities Institute (Feb. 15, 2002) (stating that before 1990 the SEC had used courts’ equitable powers 
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After Congress passed the Remedies Act, federal courts began to 
push back against the SEC’s efforts to obtain bar orders.50  Judges began 
to apply a six-factor test when considering SEC bar petitions.51  The six-
factor test, proposed by Professor Jayne Barnard, asks courts to weigh: 
(1) the egregiousness of the defendant’s violation; (2) the defendant’s 
“repeat offender” status; (3) the defendant’s role or position when he 
engaged in fraud; (4) the defendant’s degree of scienter; (5) the 
defendant’s economic stake in the violation; and (6) the likelihood the 
misconduct will recur.52  
The District Court of New York first applied the six-factor test in 
SEC v. Shah, an unreported case that declined to impose a lifetime bar 
against a pharmaceutical executive who had bribed FDA officials and 
traded stock based on his knowledge of his company’s illegal 
activities.53  In weighing the six factors, the court found that the 
defendant: had avoided relatively small losses through his trades, had 
not been involved in prior violations of the securities laws, and had not 
engaged in “clandestine trading such as tipping, purchasing stock in the 
names of other people, or trading in a secret account,” factors which “do 
not suggest a very high degree of scienter.”54  The court concluded that 
since the defendant had no record of prior violations and had already 
been “severely punished,” the likelihood of future misconduct was 
“relatively slight.”55  Thus, although the defendant was an officer of the 
subsidiary of the company whose stock he traded, and had received the 
entire economic benefit of his trades, the court concluded that the SEC 
had not shown that the defendant was “substantially unfit” to serve as a 
director or officer of a public company.56  
In a related case, SEC v. Patel, the defendant appealed a district court 
order imposing a lifetime bar.57  Patel was an executive of Par 
Pharmaceuticals Inc., the parent company of the firm involved in Shah.58  
The Patel court endorsed the six-factor test, while stating that these were 
 
to obtain bars against “approximately 100 individuals” mostly through consent decrees). 
 50. Philip F.S. Berg, Note, Unfit To Serve: Permanently Barring People from Serving as Officers 
and Directors of Publicly Traded Companies After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1871, 
1877–78 (2003). 
 51. See SEC v. Shah, No. 92 CIV. 1952 (RPP), 1993 WL 288285, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 
1993).  
 52. Id. (reciting the six factors); see also Jayne W. Barnard, When Is a Corporate Executive 
“Substantially Unfit to Serve”?, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1489, 1510–20 (1992). 
 53. Shah, 1993 U.S. Dist. WL 288285 at *1. 
 54. Id. at *7. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 58. Id. at 138. 
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not exclusive factors to be considered.59  While acknowledging that 
courts have broad discretion when imposing bars, the Second Circuit 
took issue with the district court’s permanent bar order.  It overturned 
the order, because the district court had not considered whether a bar 
limited in time or scope might serve as a sufficient remedy.60  The case 
was thus remanded for the district court to explicitly consider whether a 
limited bar was appropriate.61   
Whether or not one agrees with the end results in Shah and Patel, the 
cases show that the six-factor test offers little practical guidance as to 
when a bar should be imposed.62  The Patel test does not inform courts 
or the SEC which of the six factors are most important or how many 
factors must be satisfied to justify a bar.  Nor does the test provide much 
guidance as to what constitutes “egregiousness” or a “high degree of 
scienter” and what kind of evidence would show a likelihood of future 
misconduct.63  The test also fails to delineate those situations in which a 
time-limited bar may be more appropriate than a permanent bar.64  For 
example, courts somewhat formalistically assert that future misconduct 
is unlikely where there is no record of prior securities offenses.  This 
reasoning conflates two of the factors in the six-factor test, making the 
sixth factor seem superfluous.  In the end, most courts applying Patel 
simply tick through the six factors and reach whatever determination 
they find appropriate.65 
After Patel, the SEC continued to face obstacles when seeking bar 
orders in federal court.  A particularly needling case was SEC v. 
Farrell.66  In Farrell, an outside director of a community bank was 
 
 59. Id. at 141 (finding the six factors “useful in making the unfitness assessment”). 
 60. Id. at 142 (“[W]e take note of the fact that the governing statute provides that a bar on 
service as an officer or director that is based on substantial unfitness may be imposed ‘conditionally or 
unconditionally’ and ‘permanently or for such period of time as [the court] shall determine.’  We take 
these provisions to suggest that, before imposing a permanent bar, the court should consider whether a 
conditional bar (e.g., a bar limited to a particular industry) and/or a bar limited in time (e.g., a bar of five 
years) might be sufficient, especially where there is no prior history of unfitness.”). 
 61. Id. 
 62. The truncated test that courts adopted ignores the wisdom proffered in Professor Barnard’s 
discussion of a discarded seventh factor: the defendant’s appreciation of an executive’s fiduciary 
obligations.  Professor Barnard recommended that the court “satisfy itself that a defendant is at least as 
worthy of public trust and confidence as corporate executives of other corporations.  The defendant 
bears the burden of persuasion on this issue.”  Barnard, supra note 52, at 1521. 
 63. Professor Barnard offers a far more textured analysis of these issues in her writings.  See 
Barnard, supra note 52, at 1511; Jayne W. Barnard, Rule 10b-5 and the “Unfitness” Question, 47 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 9 (2005). 
 64. Jayne W. Barnard, SEC Debarment of Officers and Directors After Sarbanes-Oxley, 59 BUS. 
LAW. 391, 412–13 (2004). 
 65. See Steven J. Crimmins, Where Are We Going with SEC Officer and Director Bars?, 38 
BLOOMBERG/BNA SEC. REG. & L. R. 717 (2006) (courts “apply [Patel’s] six factors in a summary 
fashion”). 
 66. SEC. v. Farrell, No. 95-CV-6133T, 1996 WL 788367 (W.D.N.Y 1996); Cutler, supra note 
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convicted of insider trading for trading and tipping others to inside 
information about a pending acquisition of his bank.  Although Farrell 
pled guilty, the district court concluded that a permanent bar order was 
not appropriate.67  The court found that “Farrell’s securities violations 
were serious and he did engage in fraudulent conduct in the hopes that 
his illegal activities would not be discovered.  However, upon release 
from prison, he should not be barred from holding any other officer or 
director positions.”68  Instead, the court reasoned that because Farrell 
was “a talented executive and a permanent bar would effectively prevent 
him from using those talents to rebuild his life,” he should be 
permanently barred only “from holding an officer/director position with 
any banking or financial institutions.”69 
B. Enhanced SEC Authority 
The SEC bristled at its occasional failure to obtain bar orders when 
challenged in federal court.70  Its leaders began to argue that, as applied, 
the six-factor test was unreasonably demanding.71  In particular, SEC 
officials objected to courts’ demand that the agency prove a likelihood 
of re-offending, a factor courts viewed skeptically in the absence of 
prior offenses.72  In a display of frustration with the federal courts’ 
approach, Enforcement Director Stephen Cutler declared, “when it 
comes to O&D bars, the courts have simply lost their way.”73   
After Enron and WorldCom, the SEC sought enhanced authority to 
impose officer and director bars.  The agency got its wish when 
Congress enacted the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002.  Sarbanes–Oxley 
strengthened the SEC’s hand in two important ways.74  First, Congress 
lowered the standard for imposing a bar from “substantial unfitness” to 
“unfitness.”75  Second, Congress granted the SEC power to impose bars 
in administrative proceedings as well as in federal court based on the 
 
49. 
 67. Farrell, 1996 WL 788367 at *8. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. 
 70. According to Barnard, courts had flatly rejected the SEC’s bar petitions in only two reported 
cases.  In several other cases, courts imposed a lesser sanction than the SEC sought.  Barnard, supra 
note 64, at 396–97. 
 71. Cutler, supra note 49 (asserting that the “substantial unfitness” requirement had “spawned a 
burdensome and overly restrictive test for imposing officer and director bars”). 
 72. Id. (criticizing the courts’ holding in SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Berg, supra note 50, at 1899. 
 75. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 107 P. L. 204 § 305, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at Exchange Act 
§ 21(d)(2)(f); Securities Act § 20(e); 15 USC § 7243). 
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same “unfitness” standard.76  Curiously, in the time since Sarbanes–
Oxley, the agency has not made much use of the new powers it so 
vigorously pursued. 
The SEC lobbied hard for power to impose officer and director bars 
in administrative proceedings without the need to file charges in federal 
court.  Although Congress balked at this request in 1990, it acceded in 
2002 when it adopted Sarbanes–Oxley.77  It is therefore surprising that 
since that time, the SEC has rarely used its administrative authority to 
impose bars.78  A possible explanation is that the kinds of cases in which 
the SEC seeks bars are usually serious enough that the agency wants to 
make use of the full panoply of the federal court’s injunctive powers.79 
The new “unfitness” standard for which the SEC lobbied has also 
failed to yield significantly different on-the-ground results.  
Commentators agree that Congress intended to ease the SEC’s burden 
when it changed the standard for imposing bars from “substantial 
unfitness” to “unfitness.”80  Yet, federal courts continue to apply the 
onerous six-factor Patel test, developed under the “substantially unfit” 
standard, which Congress has since rejected.81  Practically speaking, 
therefore, the SEC remains in the same position with respect to officer 
and director bars that it occupied prior to 2002. 
C. The SEC’s Approach to Bars in the Post-Crisis Era 
More important from the standpoint of this Article, the SEC remains 
reluctant to use the bar to address director oversight failures.82  In fact, 
the SEC rarely seeks bars against directors, requesting the remedy only 
in the most egregious cases.  In two recent cases in which the SEC 
sought bars, the directors had ignored multiple employee warnings, 
 
 76. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 107 P. L. 204  § 1105, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at Exchange Act 
§ 21(c)(3); Securities Act §§ 8A(f) and 20(e); 15 USC § 78u-3).  
 77. See Barnard, supra note 64, at 395–96 (recounting history). 
 78. See Crimmins, supra note 65; BRIAN A. OCHS ET AL., Sanctions and Collateral 
Consequences, in THE SEC ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 181, 230 (Richard M. Phillips ed., 2d. ed. 2007). 
 79. See Crimmins, supra note 65.   
 80. Id. 
 81. SEC v. Johnson, No. 04-4114, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 8230, at *11–12 (3d Cir. Apr. 5, 2006) 
(applying Patel factors); see also Crimmins, supra note 65 (stating that the change from “substantial 
unfitness” to unfitness has been largely ignored by the courts, which continue to look to the Patel six-
factor test); Jon Carlson, Securities Fraud, Officer and Director Bars, and the “Unfitness” Inquiry After 
Sarbanes-Oxley, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. FIN. L. 679, 697 (2009) (courts still erroneously assert the 
standard for a bar is “substantial unfitness”).  Some courts have applied a new nine-factor test that 
Professor Barnard proposed after Sarbanes–Oxley.  See Barnard, supra note 63, at 46 (outlining 
proposed new framework); SEC v. Levine, 517 F. Supp. 2d 121, 145–46 (D.D.C. 2007) (applying 
proposed framework).  Still, in SEC v. Bankosky, the Second Circuit reaffirmed the validity of the Patel 
factors despite the new statutory language.  SEC v. Bankosky, No. 12-2943-cv (2d Cir. May 14, 2013). 
 82. Jones & Welsh, supra note 15, at 396. 
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auditor and law firm resignations, and allowed executives suspected of 
misconduct to retain their positions and thus continue their fraud.83  
Statements from recent SEC Enforcement Directors confirm the view 
that the officer and director bar is reserved only for the most blatant 
cases of director malfeasance.  Linda Chatman Thomsen, who served as 
Enforcement Director from 2005 to 2009, observed in a 2008 speech to 
corporate directors, “the Commission rarely sues directors solely in their 
capacity as directors.”84  In fact, she reported that during a three-year 
period, the SEC “brought more than 1,800 enforcement actions 
involving more than 3,000 defendants,” but had “sued less than a dozen 
outside directors.”85  Her successor, Robert Khuzami, similarly 
pronounced, “we will not second-guess the good-faith efforts of 
directors,” when explaining the agency’s decision to charge directors of 
a small public company who had “turned a blind eye to warning signs of 
fraud.”86  True to Khuzami’s assurances, only one bar has been imposed 
against a top executive of a large financial institution whose fraudulent 
activities contributed to the financial crisis, and not one nonexecutive 
director of a failed financial firm has faced SEC charges.87   
 
 83. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Military Body Armor Supplier and Former Outside 
Directors With Accounting Fraud (Feb. 28, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr21867.htm; Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Former 
Executives in Illegal Scheme to Enrich CEO With Perks (Mar. 15, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-39.htm. 
 84. Linda Chatman Thomsen, Director, Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Speech, Keeping Up With the Smartest Guys in the Room: Raising the Bar for Corporate 
Boards (May 12, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch051208lct.htm. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Military Body Armor Supplier and Former Outside 
Directors With Accounting Fraud (Feb. 28, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-52.htm. 
 87. In 2010,  former Countrywide CEO, Angelo Mozilo agreed to pay $67.5 million to settle 
SEC claims that he misled investors about Countrywide’s financial position.  Press Release, SEC, 
Former Countrywide CEO Angelo Mozilo to Pay SEC’s Largest-Ever Financial Penalty Against a 
Public Company’s Senior Executive (Oct. 15, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-197.htm.  Mozilo also consented to a permanent officer and 
director bar.  Id.  The former COO and CFO of Countrywide paid smaller amounts in penalties and 
consented to time-limited bars.  None of the defendants admitted liability in the Countrywide settlement.  
In February 2011, the Justice Department dropped its criminal investigation of the same Countrywide 
executives.  See E. Scott Reckard, U.S. Drops Criminal Probe of Former Countrywide Chief Angelo 
Mozilo, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2011. 
  In the only other financial crisis case to end with sanctions against executives of a too-big-to-
fail firm, Citigroup CFO Gary Crittenden and Chief Investor Relations Officer Arthur Tidesley agreed 
to pay $100,000 and $80,000, respectively, to settle SEC charges, brought in an administrative 
proceeding, that they knowingly misled investors about Citigroup’s subprime exposure.  See Press 
Release, SEC, SEC Charges Former Mortgage Lending Executives with Securities Fraud (Feb. 11, 
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-43.htm.  The two men settled the claims 
without admitting or denying liability and were not subject to bar orders.  Id.  The SEC also charged the 
CEO of a less prominent firm, IndyMac, and several other senior executives with securities fraud.  
IndyMac CEO Michael Perry settled the claim by agreeing to pay $80,000 without admitting or denying 
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IV. THE DETERRENT CAPACITY OF THE OFFICER AND DIRECTOR BAR 
A. Advantages over Monetary Sanctions 
Despite the SEC’s current hands-off approach to high-level 
executives and directors, experienced securities lawyers observe that the 
officer and director bar is the most feared securities law remedy 
available.  Commissioner Luis Aguilar recently stated, “During my four 
years as a Commissioner, I’ve noticed how hard defendants fight to 
avoid officer and director bars.  It is one of the sanctions that they fear 
most, which is what precisely makes it one of the most effective 
sanctions available.”88  Former SEC Director of Corporate Finance, 
Alan Beller, made similar comments in 2010 on a panel at the Annual 
Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools.89   
Considering the deterrent potential of the officer and director bar, one 
wonders why the SEC remains reluctant to pursue the remedy against 
executives and directors of large firms.  The enforcement chiefs’ 
apparent “laying down of arms” is especially befuddling.  Taking the 
“most feared” remedy off the table before the SEC even opens a case 
seems to be a strategic mistake.  A better approach would be to ensure 
that all directors and executives are aware of the possibility of a bar for 
securities violations while exercising discretion to seek the remedy only 
in appropriate circumstances.90 
As a remedy, the bar on future service offers several advantages over 
monetary penalties, especially as applied to independent directors, who 
generally have a more tangential connection to the fraud.  First, and 
most importantly, the bar is preventative.  It can keep a fraudster or 
incompetent director from serving in such capacity in the future, thereby 
protecting investors from future harm.91  Second, the bar underscores the 
social message embedded in Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank 
regarding the importance of directors’ oversight duties.  
In addition, the bar skirts the most common objections to imposing 
monetary liability on independent directors.  As a penalty, the bar is less 
 
liability.  Despite the SEC’s initial intention to pursue the remedy, Perry did not consent to an officer 
and director bar. 
 88. Aguilar, supra note 14. 
 89. See Lisa Fairfax, The Bar on Director and Officer Bars, THE CONGLOMERATE (Jan. 12, 
2010), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2010/01/the-bar-on-director-and-officer-bars.html (reporting on 
discussion at the AALS Annual Meeting in January 2010). 
 90. Professor Barnard has offered insightful commentary on when it is appropriate to impose a 
bar.  See, e.g., Barnard, supra note 49; Barnard, supra note 64.  Although courts have adopted many of 
Professor Barnard’s recommendations, they sometimes unreasonably demand concrete evidence, as 
opposed to reasonable conjecture, that a defendant presents a risk of future harm to investors. 
 91. Johnson, supra note 21, at 523–24. 
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severe than astronomical monetary awards and settlements that can be 
extracted in shareholder suits and SEC enforcement actions, which 
many commentators argue are unfair.92  The bar can be calibrated to 
reflect a director’s degree of culpability, with time-limited bars imposed 
for merely reckless conduct, or when directors express contrition or 
cooperate with authorities.93  Permanent bars, meanwhile, can be 
reserved for directors who knowingly participate in, cover up, or benefit 
from fraud.  Finally, corporate officials cannot avoid the consequences 
of a bar through indemnification or insurance.94  Thus, unlike the terms 
of a typical SEC settlement,95 the bar requires that individuals account 
for their acts or omissions.   
B. Who is “Unfit”? 
It is difficult to argue in the abstract that the conduct of the directors 
of a firm enmeshed in fraud merits the imposition of a bar order.  As 
noted above, under Patel, imposing a bar requires consideration of six 
factors including the egregiousness of the fraud, an individual’s role, the 
degree of scienter, the financial stake in the fraud, the record of prior 
offenses, and the likelihood of re-offending.96  Assessing such factors is 
possible only with the benefit of a full-scale investigation.  However, 
reviewing the facts of a well-reported case helps to demonstrate how 
director oversight failures can sometimes facilitate corporate fraud and 
contribute to massive investor losses.  
1. Enron 1.0 
Most readers are familiar with the reports showing that WorldCom 
and Enron directors were asleep at the wheel and thus, failed to prevent 
their corporations’ massive frauds.97  Yet, the details surrounding a less 
 
 92. Id. at 532 (“Debarment relief has the advantage of sanctioning misconduct while not 
depleting the financial resources of the companies themselves, whose investor and creditor 
constituencies may be unaware of and innocent of wrongdoing.”). 
 93. Barnard, supra note 63, at 32–33. 
 94. Cutler, supra note 49 (acknowledging that “monetary penalties—often paid by D&O 
insurance . . . are not always sufficient to achieve the deterrence we seek”). 
 95. See, e.g., MacDonald, supra note 2; Buell, supra note 8. 
 96. See supra, text at notes 50–56. 
 97. See WILLIAM C. POWERS, Jr., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE 
COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 22 (Feb. 1, 2002), available at 
news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/enron/specinv020102rpt1.pdf (reporting that Enron’s Board of Directors 
failed in its oversight duties); RICHARD C. BREEDEN, RESTORING TRUST: REPORT TO THE HONORABLE 
JED S. RAKOFF ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF MCI, at 22 (Aug. 2003) SK034 ALI-
ABA 761, 787, available at news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/worldcom/corpgov82603rpt.pdf (finding that 
“Among other things, the board of directors of the Company consistently ceded power over the direction 
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familiar Enron fraud show starkly how director complicity and passivity 
can help set the stage for a devastating corporate collapse.  In The 
Smartest Guys in the Room, Bethany McLean and Peter Elkind detail 
how Enron directors responded to the discovery of accounting 
manipulation and embezzlement at the small trading unit, Enron Oil.98  
A 1987 report from Enron’s auditors revealed glaring problems at Enron 
Oil, yet Enron’s audit committee abided management’s decision to 
sweep the matter under the rug.99  Later, when rogue trading at the same 
unit nearly plunged Enron into bankruptcy, CEO Ken Lay and the board 
of directors feigned shock at the news, and again sought to cover up the 
full scope of the misconduct.100   
When Enron finally disclosed the trading shenanigans at Enron Oil, 
the SEC opened an investigation, creating an opportunity for 
investigators to follow the fraud to the top of the organization.  Instead, 
the SEC and Justice chose to pursue charges only against the mid-level 
managers whom Enron’s leaders had misleadingly fingered as rogue 
traders.101  Years later, a pervasive pattern of accounting manipulation, 
irreverence toward the law, and abusive self-dealing had taken hold at 
Enron; conduct that was facilitated by Enron directors who 
unreasonably took management’s implausible explanations of 
questionable activities at face value.  Had the SEC conducted a more 
thorough investigation of Enron Oil, and probed directors’ knowledge of 
the problems, it could have taken action against Enron’s executives and 
directors for their role in covering up the fraud.  Had regulators taken 
firm action at the time, they may even have prevented the Enron 
scandal, as we now know it, from occurring.  
Under current law, the officer and director bar is available only for 
securities violations involving scienter, a state of mind encompassing 
intent or recklessness.102  The scienter requirement would likely 
complicate efforts to address instances of director inattention, which 
 
of the Company to (CEO) Ebbers . . . [who] was allowed nearly imperial reign over the affairs of the 
Company, without the board of directors exercising any apparent restraint on his actions”); DICK 
THORNBURGH, SECOND INTERIM REPORT, at 7 (June 9, 2003), available at 
news.findlaw.com/wsj/docs/worldcom/bkexmnr60903rpt2d.pdf (finding that “WorldCom was 
dominated by Messrs. Ebbers and Sullivan with virtually no checks or restraints placed on their actions 
by the Board of Directors or other Management.  Significantly, although many present or former 
officers and Directors . . . had misgivings regarding decisions or actions by Mr. Ebbers . . . there is no 
evidence that these officers and Directors made any attempts to curb, stop or challenge the 
conduct . . . they deemed questionable or inappropriate.”). 
 98. BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING 
RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 17–21 (2004). 
 99. Id. at 20.  
 100. Id. at 23. 
 101. Id. at 24. 
 102. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
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sound more in negligence than fraud.  However, the Enron Oil debacle 
shows that in some of the most dramatic instances of corporate fraud, 
the conduct of senior officers and directors meets the scienter standard.  
After all, Ken Lay and Enron’s directors knew about the problems at 
Enron Oil, including accounting manipulation, sham transactions, 
unauthorized trading, and embezzlement.  Yet they decided to let the 
responsible executives keep their positions and continue their fraudulent 
activities and reckless trading.  Enron’s managers relied on Enron Oil to 
deliver paper profits that helped mask the company’s true financial 
position, and worried little about how such “profits” were concocted.103 
2. The Financial Crisis Cases 
As Professor Lyman Johnson observes with respect to the financial 
crisis, “hindsight . . . shows that stunningly bad and avoidable decisions 
obviously were made in high places that were bankruptcy inducing for 
numerous organizations.”104  This observation is supported by findings 
from special investigators appointed by Congress and the courts to 
determine what led the failed financial firms to ruin.105  Anton Valukas, 
the Bankruptcy Examiner who investigated potential claims against 
Lehman’s directors and officers, concluded that colorable claims existed 
against CEO Richard Fuld and several former Lehman CFOs.106  
Likewise, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission found that Citigroup 
and other large investment banks “experienced massive losses because 
of significant failures of corporate governance including risk 
management.”107  The FCIC further concluded that Merrill Lynch, 
Citigroup, and Bear Stearns all understated their subprime mortgage 
exposures in public statements to investors.108   
Despite ample basis for inquiry revealed by these reports, the SEC did 
not pursue action against high-level executives and directors of these 
firms.109  In all of the SEC settlements with too-big-to-fail firms, 
directors and senior executives have been spared monetary liability and 
 
 103. MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 98, at 20–21. 
 104. Johnson, supra note 21, at 535. 
 105. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT (2011) 
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any other form of personal accountability.110  For reasons that remain 
unclear, the SEC has not vigorously pursued claims against executives 
and directors of failed financial firms, leaving it to private litigants to 
take on the task. 
Although faced with formidable obstacles, in several high profile 
cases plaintiffs’ claims against directors and executives of these same 
firms survived preliminary motions to dismiss.111  When these lawsuits 
settled, the directors’ and officers’ liability was covered by insurance.112  
Still, the private litigants’ ability to successfully plead scienter against 
the CEOs and senior executives of too-big-to-fail firms suggests the 
SEC could also have prevailed had it chosen to pursue claims against 
these same individuals.113 
C. Toward a New Standard for “Unfitness” 
1. The Need for SEC Guidance 
For the SEC to fully assert its power to bar officers and directors, 
federal courts must show more deference to the SEC’s assessment as to 
when a bar is appropriate.  To encourage such deference, the SEC 
should publish guidance on the factors it considers important in seeking 
bars.  The SEC has unwisely left this discussion to academics and the 
courts and has yet to make clear its rationale for pursuing bars.  This ad 
hoc approach leaves the SEC open to charges of overreaching and using 
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inconsistent criteria to impose bars.  
The SEC has addressed the issue of unfitness in inquiries under other 
provisions of law that permit the agency to bar professionals such as 
securities brokers and investment advisers.114  Similar questions arose 
when the SEC fashioned guidelines on how to exercise authority under 
Rule 102(e) to bar attorneys and accountants from appearing before it.115  
The SEC should draw on these principles to clearly set forth the 
circumstances in which it will pursue bar orders and the rationale it will 
use to distinguish between those cases that merit permanent bars and 
cases in which time-limited bars are more appropriate.116  
2. Proposed Considerations 
In fashioning such guidance, the SEC must start from the accepted 
proposition that imposing a bar requires something more than just a 
Section 17(a) or Rule 10b-5 violation.117  The SEC should urge courts to 
focus the unfitness inquiry on the conduct that is the subject of the 
enforcement action and what that conduct reveals about the defendant’s 
character.118  After all, it is the defendant’s character, not whether he has 
been caught before, that tells the most about whether he is likely to re-
offend.119  The two factors that seem most relevant for assessing the 
propriety of the bar are the egregiousness of the fraud and the 
defendant’s contrition (or lack thereof).   
In evaluating egregiousness, courts should consider the magnitude of 
losses attributable to a defendant’s conduct, and whether the defendant 
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acted as a ringleader or was a reluctant participant in the fraud.  In 
oversight cases, courts should consider how long the fraud continued 
without the defendant’s intervention and the overtness of any red flags 
ignored.  In considering the defendant’s contrition, courts should assess 
whether the defendant acknowledges her mistakes, accepts 
responsibility, and indicates a willingness to change.  As Professor 
Barnard wisely counseled in her first article on the subject, the 
defendant should have the burden of persuading the court that despite 
her fraud, she can be trusted once again in a fiduciary position at a 
public company.120 
An alternative inquiry would borrow from banking law’s approach to 
officer and director bars.121  Under federal banking laws, regulators have 
the power to bar officers, directors, or other individuals from working at 
depository institutions.122  To impose a bar, regulators must show: (1) a 
violation of law, safety and soundness standards, or breach of fiduciary 
duty; (2) the violation or breach has the effect of causing substantial 
financial harm, prejudicing the interests of depositors, or benefiting the 
party; and (3) the violation or breach involves personal dishonesty or a 
willful or continuing disregard for the safety and soundness of the 
institution.123  In addition, under current FDIC rules, the FDIC can claw-
back compensation from any person “substantially responsible for the 
failed condition” if they “[f]ailed to conduct [their] responsibilities with 
the degree of skill and care an ordinarily prudent person in a like 
position would exercise under similar circumstances,” and their failure 
to exercise care “caused a loss that materially contributed to the failure 
of the company.”124  Because the banking law approach arguably 
involves federal regulators in the enforcement of state-based duties, 
Congress may need to expand the scope of the SEC’s enforcement 
powers for the agency to adopt similar standards. 
To earn the deference it seeks from courts, the SEC may also have to 
ease up on the throttle.  Several commentators have expressed the view 
that permanent bars should be the exception rather than the rule.125  The 
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bar is most appropriate when a defendant uses his or her corporate 
position to defraud investors through accounting manipulation, 
misleading disclosures, or self-dealing.126  Yet, a review of the cases in 
which the SEC seeks bars suggests it focuses its enforcement power on 
executives at smaller firms, as opposed to large companies.127   
As Professor Barnard notes, the SEC often seeks to bar individuals 
who sold unregistered securities, maintained pump-and-dump schemes, 
or made quick cash trading in their company’s stock.128  Such conduct is 
reprehensible, but not nearly as threatening to society as the Enron, 
WorldCom, or Lehman-scale frauds.  As noted above, in the few 
settlements with senior executives charged in financial crisis cases, only 
Countrywide executives received permanent or temporary bars.129  More 
troubling, none of the directors of bailed-out or failed too-big-to-fail 
firms have faced federal charges for securities fraud or related 
misconduct.  
D. Anticipated Objections 
Corporate and securities law commentators have largely overlooked 
the bar as a potentially ameliorative remedy.130  Despite the limited 
commentary, it is not difficult to anticipate the kinds of objections that 
might arise should the SEC pursue this course.  Criticism would likely 
proceed along the following lines: 
1. The Bar is Too Harsh, Unfair, and Would Deter Board Service 
Some federal judges who have denied SEC bar petitions have asserted 
that the remedy is too draconian, because it could potentially deprive the 
defendant of his or her future livelihood.131  This concern is overstated.  
For most directors, a directorship is not a full time job, which means a 
 
one to five years.”). 
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bar would not deprive a director defendant of his principal source of 
income.  Furthermore, the bar on serving as an officer applies only to 
executive level positions, where the person serves in a policy-making 
role.132  Thus, although a bar would keep defendants from occupying 
fiduciary positions, they would still be permitted to work for public 
corporations in nonexecutive roles.  In addition, defendants are free to 
pursue self-employment or work in high-level positions at privately-held 
firms.133   
The Martha Stewart case provides one example of how the bar can 
protect investors and discipline untrustworthy fiduciaries without 
depriving a defendant of her future livelihood.  In 2002, Stewart, the 
founder, controlling shareholder and CEO of Martha Stewart Living 
Omnimedia (MSO), was caught up in controversy related to her trading 
in another company’s stock.  During the investigation, Stewart misled 
federal officials about the true reasons for her trades.  Stewart was 
charged and convicted on four counts of obstructing justice and lying to 
federal investigators and sentenced to five months in prison.134 
Despite her legal troubles, Stewart remained employed with MSO.  
Upon her indictment, she assumed the nonexecutive position, “Founder” 
of MSO.135  Stewart later consented to a 5-year bar order to settle the 
SEC’s insider trading charges.136  After her release from prison in 2010, 
while still subject to a bar order, Stewart became Chief Editorial, Media 
and Content Officer of MSO.  When the 5-year bar lapsed, Stewart 
rejoined MSO’s board.137  As the founder and controlling shareholder of 
MSO, Stewart does not represent the typical barred defendant.  
Nonetheless, her experience demonstrates that an individual can 
maintain employment at a public company while subject to a bar order. 
2. Rehabilitation/Redemption 
Much of the difficulty the SEC has faced when seeking bars involves 
its efforts to obtain permanent bar orders.  One objection to permanent 
bars is that they do not allow for the possibility of rehabilitation or 
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redemption.138  For that reason, Professor Barnard and others maintain 
that permanent bar orders should be limited to true recidivists or those 
whose fraud leads to catastrophic losses.  The answer to this concern is 
not to abandon bars but to pursue them more judiciously.  The SEC 
should seek time-limited bars as a matter of course and reserve requests 
for permanent bars for the most serious violations.  The risk of facing a 
time-limited bar and the attendant reputational harm should serve as a 
sufficient deterrent to fraud, and when imposed, such bars send a strong 
message about society’s disapproval of the defendant’s conduct.139   
3. Insisting on Bars Would Make Settlements Impossible 
SEC officials would likely argue that insisting on bars as a settlement 
condition will make it more difficult for the agency to settle cases 
efficiently.  This is, of course, the principal justification the agency 
offers to defend its policy of allowing defendants to settle without 
admitting or denying liability.140  Undoubtedly this is true.  Securities 
lawyers emphasize that most defendants strongly resist the bar order.  
But this only suggests that the SEC may be driving too soft a bargain in 
its settlement negotiations.141  When corporate defendants eagerly 
accede to settlement terms, an enforcement action becomes akin to a 
speeding ticket.  Most drivers readily pay such fines to preserve their 
driving privileges.   
More importantly, the SEC is capable of settling cases even when it 
cannot reach agreement regarding the appropriateness of the bar.  A 
recent practice has developed in which the parties submit a consent 
decree containing all of the settlement terms but litigate the issue of the 
bar in federal court.142  In some of these actions, the courts reject the bar 
petition.143  Frequently, however, courts grant the relief requested.144  
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4. Federalism Concerns 
A final reservation about the increased use of bar orders may be the 
potential SEC incursion into a traditional state law domain.  According 
to conventional conceptions, federal securities laws are meant to address 
disclosure issues, while state law governs officer and director conduct 
standards.  Utilizing the bar to discipline corporate officers and directors 
would, therefore, enmesh the SEC more deeply in corporate governance 
matters.  Such concerns seem grounded in an outdated understanding of 
the division between state and federal authority in corporate law matters.   
Since the Exchange Act was adopted in 1934, the SEC has enjoyed 
authority to regulate areas of corporate governance such as proxy voting 
and insider trading.145  Over the years, Congress has continued to 
expand the SEC role in regulating corporate governance.146  With 
Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank, Congress directly charged directors 
of public companies with responsibility for overseeing financial 
reporting, executive compensation, and risk management.  By 
encouraging the SEC to use its authority to enforce these enhanced 
oversight duties, this Article simply seeks to ensure a remedy exists 
when directors fail to perform the functions Congress has assigned to 
them.  To the extent these recommendations strain the contours of 
existing SEC authority, Congress should take action to formalize the 
agency’s power in this realm.  
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article addresses the concerns expressed by many scholars that 
the federal securities laws have lost their deterrent effect.  It focuses on 
an existing remedy in the SEC’s toolkit that thus far has received too 
little scholarly attention.  Broader utilization of officer and director bars 
should help motivate senior executives and directors to perform their 
duties faithfully.  Although some of the strategies recommended in this 
Article may require action by Congress, the SEC has the power to 
pursue most of the recommendations without awaiting further statutory 
or doctrinal reforms. 
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